Pilot Response to Emergency and Abnormal Situations

- Training has limits - meet minimal performance requirements. But learning is life-long and provides experience. This comes from personal experience and learning from others. Experience gives the ability to anticipate, be proactive, plan for alternative possibilities, problem solve, and trouble shoot on the fly.

Regarding the TSA & Emergency & Abnormals:
- The TSA is still new and relatively uneducated with respect to aviation.
- They are therefore defensive, but susceptible to education. Is ATA or anyone else trying to do this?

- How do you filter data from LOSA/FOQUA?

- Poor captain leadership.

- Lets hear Neil's 2nd was story.

- Neil is getting to the global cognitive skills that need to be addressed.
- Don needs to address security procedures influence on all aspects of pilot response to emergency and abnormal, along with normal situations.

- Captain Neil Johnston has given me a renewed breath of fresh air with his approach to emergencies and abnormal events. His no B.S. way of looking at this issue should be the industry's way of thinking.

- I like the proposed approach to addressing workload with strategic practice actions.
- How far can generic models take training of necessary competencies?
- Do we need better analysis of crew competencies and linkages to solutions whether they be checklist, training, cultural changes, or equipment changes?

- Tapping the expertise in an excellent innovation.
- Security versus cabin communication does need to be incorporated.

- Relying on "common sense" can lead to greater risk, not all persons share the same "common sense" space.

- Hindsight bias is a very important factor in pilots not wanting to declare an emergency, go-around from an unstable approach, or evacuate on a runway or taxiway. I see 1600 pilots a year and this (hindsight bias) is always mentioned and discussed.
- I like the concept of "solve the situation, not necessarily the problem". Solve the problem considerations should be placed at the top of some checklists, ex "Smoke in Cockpit and Cabin". It is a good idea and may be a way to enhance ADM.

- During complex emergencies pilot may not have time to pull out the checklists and follow them step-by-step – ex. UAL FLT 811/ALO Flt. 243.
- Therefore, pilots need training in prioritizing with an emphasis on safety and flying the airplane.
- And, pilots need a working knowledge of systems and what checklists are in the manual so that the necessary and critical items get done, despite the checklists not being read and performed to completion.

- Pilots need to have access to, and understand the philosophy behind the policies and procedures that are contained in any checklist. To deny them this information denies them the context of why they are doing them. This only raises questions as they execute them under time pressure and thus fosters errors.

Standard phraseology for terms used is EAS.
- Example: Do you call out "Reject", "Abort", or "Stop", to initiate an RTO?
- This is problematic for crews caused by our "dynamic" industry with displacements, furloughs, etc.
- Standardization is important in mixed fleet operations, especially with multiple training events across different fleets.